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BIG DATA DISTORTIONS: EXPLORING THE LIMITS
OF THE ABA LEATPR STANDARDS
ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON *
Before moving on to my contribution about how the growing reliance on
big data analytics may necessitate a slight modification to the ABA
Standards on Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records (LEATPR
Standards), 1 I would like first to pay a few compliments to the drafters of
the LEATPR Standards for producing such a systematic, thoughtful, and
elegant framework for considering Fourth Amendment freedoms. As
anyone who writes about or teaches the Fourth Amendment knows, the
doctrine remains a theoretical muddle.2 Yet, despite a minefield of
conflicting precedent, the drafters of the LEATPR Standards have managed
to construct a defensible and coherent structure on which to build third
party protections. I hope legislatures take note of the logic, scholarship,
and wisdom of the committee in providing such a considered analysis of a
complex problem.
Introduction
The value in “third party records” is information—masses of revealing
information. 3 This data can expose clues about individuals, groups, or
patterns of criminal activity. 4 This data can identify, link, and prove

* Associate Professor of Law, David A. Clarke School of Law at the University of the
District of Columbia. Thank you to Professor Stephen Henderson for inviting me to
participate in the Oklahoma Law Review Symposium.
1. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD
PARTY RECORDS (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter LEATPR STANDARDS]. Individual standards will
be referred to using the format ‘STANDARD x-x.’
2. See Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court,
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 6-7 (2002); Orin S. Kerr, An
Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 479
(2011).
3. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 2 (2013).
4. See, e.g., JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT
FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 87 (2011), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_inn
ovation; Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the
Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 240 (2013).
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involvement in crime. 5 Much of this data is personal: involving
information individuals may hope to keep private from law enforcement
officials. 6 As a result, individuals’ desire to keep this information private is
often in conflict with law enforcement’s obligation to aggressively pursue
investigations, which may include accessing personal data. This tension
between privacy and police investigation has been left unsatisfactorily
resolved by the current Fourth Amendment doctrine. 7 Thus, the American
Bar Associations’ Standards for Criminal Justice proposed Law
Enforcement Access to Third Party Records (LEATPR Standards) provide
an alternative approach to balance the competing needs in this new world of
available data.
The question this article poses is how the LEATPR Standards can
survive the impact of big data policing. 8 Big data policing, as described
here, involves utilizing vast, networked, commercial databases to
investigate and also predict criminal activity. 9 Big data policing involves
the use of not just third party, but “fourth party” commercial aggregators 10

5. See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and
Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 595-96 (2004); Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s
Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901,
902 (2008) (“[P]rivate organizations can at times obtain and share information more easily
and under fewer legal restrictions than the government can when it collects similar
information on its own.”).
6. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 317 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation:
Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2002)
[hereinafter Access and Aggregation].
7. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1349, 1383 (2004); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 311, 313-14 (2012); Kerr, supra note 2, at 480; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The
Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance,
86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1326 (2002); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo, A Blueprint for
Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
1303, 1321-22 (2002); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public
Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 217 (2002); James J. Tomkovicz,
Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS.
L.J. 317, 438 (2002).
8. See infra Part I.
9. Id.
10. Joshua L. Simmons, Note, Buying You: The Government’s Use of Fourth-Parties to
Launder Data About “The People”, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 950, 951-52.
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as well as de-identified datasets, which eventually can be re-identified. 11
Without doubt, the LEATPR Standards acknowledge these issues, and
arguably cover them. 12 But as set forth in this article, big data distorts the
traditional analysis and, thus, the LEATPR Standards may require a few
modifications to be useful in the future. 13
This article begins with a contestable (but defensible) premise: big data
will revolutionize policing by offering new avenues to augment current
investigation strategies. These new tactics, while having a real cost to
privacy, liberty, and autonomy, will also result in more targeted and
efficient investigations, and thus will become incredibly attractive to
police. 14
This article focuses on the distorting effects of big data policing. By
distortion, I mean that traditional understandings, language, and categories
may become blurred by the rise of big data. 15 Fortunately, the LEATPR
Standards offer a mechanism to address some of these distorting effects,
and with slight modification, can provide a clarifying lens to the problems
arising from big data policing.
Part I of this article sets out the promise and problems of big data. Big
data is revolutionizing policing, and this section explains the level and
amount of data now available for law enforcement use. In simple terms,
information about individuals is being catalogued in unprecedented ways,
including government and corporate tracking of public records, consumer
purchases, financial data, and even health data. 16 The aggregation of these
different databases has the potential to allow personal dossiers to be created
about each individual. Such commercial dossiers are valuable investigatory
tools, and once created, generate real privacy concerns. 17 The promise of
big data policing also means that in addition to continuing traditional
investigatory database searches for known suspects, law enforcement will
be able to use predictive analytics to discover unusual patterns that might
signal criminal activity from currently unknown individuals. This section
seeks to demonstrate that the potential for this type of investigatory
11. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure
of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1724 (2010); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J.
Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable
Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1877-78 (2011).
12. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 2-5 (discussing the need for standards).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part I.
17. Id.
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technique is too promising to resist and that the LEATPR Standards must
address mass, anonymous surveillance in a more sophisticated manner.
Part II explores how the LEATPR Standards currently address access to
these types of third party records. While the LEATPR Standards
adequately govern the traditional law enforcement practice of searching
established third party databases for identified records, they present some
problems in the era of big data. This Part discusses three direct distortions
of big data. First, I argue that the amount and interconnectedness of the
available data weakens legal standards like “relevance,” “reasonable
suspicion,” and “probable cause,” which are predicated on a traditional
model of limited, small data policing. 18 This critique is an analysis of how
big data affects the Fourth Amendment, but as the terminology of LEATPR
Standards derives from Fourth Amendment doctrine, this critique also
implicates the Standards. 19 Second, I argue that the conception of “records”
as envisioned in the LEATPR Standards becomes distorted in an era of
blended, aggregated databases. Information is no longer siloed in particular
identifiable third party institutions, but regularly sold, merged, and
incorporated into even larger datasets.20 In a merged dataset that includes
highly private and nonprivate information, how does one know what level
of justification is required to search? While the LEATPR Standards
suggest defaulting to the highest level of protection based on the highest
level of privacy, 21 this would prevent access to a significant amount of
valuable data. Third, I consider the problems arising from mass
surveillance searches for suspicious activity in de-identified records. These
pattern matching searches raise concerns about how one can adequately
protect de-identified data as well as larger issues of generalized mass
surveillance.
18. This is a subject I address in detail in Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and
Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2394683.
19. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 6-9 (discussing influence of the Fourth
Amendment on the Standards).
20. Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal
Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 142 (2006) (“[M]ost types of personal information—
including names, birthdates, addresses, telephone numbers, clickstream data, travel details
(flights, car rentals, hotels, train tickets) and transactional data (who bought what from
whom, when, where, and how)—are unregulated, unless the data trader violates its own
privacy policy, in which case the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) can hold the company
accountable for unfair trade practices.”).
21. See STANDARD 25-4.2 (“If a record contains different types of information, it should
be afforded the level of protection appropriate for the most private type it contains.”).
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Part III attempts to identify possible solutions to these gaps, with a
specific focus on smoothing the distortions of big data. The LEATPR
Standards offer a valuable framework for analysis, and this section merely
attempts to suggest some modifications to prepare the Standards for the
future of big data. The solutions focus on modifications to language in the
Standards, addressing each area of weakness discussed in Part II.
I. The Development of Big Data Policing
Like many evolving industries, law enforcement has recognized the
promise of big data. 22 Police work involves gathering information about
crimes and criminals, and big data offers a new tool to collect and analyze
that information.23 The ability to sort through vast datasets, identify
particular people or suspicious patterns, and catalogue the information for
future use offers new ways to track and prevent crime. 24 Much of our lives
are being recorded through digital trails of information.25 What we buy,
what we read, where we go, and where we live, work, and play are being
recorded by private companies. 26 Our interactions with government and
public resources are being collected by public institutions. 27 The
innovation of big data is the recognition that those disparate pieces of
information can be aggregated and studied in mega databases. Powerful
new computers, sophisticated algorithms, and cheap storage space have
22. See Hoofnagle, supra note 5, at 595; Robert Block, Requests for Corporate Data
Multiply: Businesses Juggle Law-Enforcement Demands for Information About Customers,
Suppliers, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2006, at A4; Bob Sullivan, Who’s Buying Cell Phone
Records Online? Cops, MSNBC (June 20, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12534959/.
23. Candice L. Kline, Comment, Security Theater and Database-Driven Information
Markets: A Case for an Omnibus U.S. Data Privacy Statute, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 443, 447
(2008); Andrea Peterson, Your Location History Is Like a Fingerprint. And Cops Can Get it
Without a Warrant, WASH. POST, July 31, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2013/07/31/your-location-history-is-like-a-fingerprint-and-cops-can-get-it-with
out-a-warrant/; Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods
on You, It May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at A1.
24. Steve Lohr, Sizing Up Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2013, at F1, available at
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/sizing-up-big-data-broadening-beyond-the-internet/.
See generally MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 4.
25. Hayley Tsukayama, Alarm on Hill over iPhone Location Tracking, WASH. POST,
Apr. 22, 2011, at A13; Troy Wolverton, iSpy: Apple’s iPhones Can Track Users’
Movements, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_17
893676.
26. Lohr, supra note 24.
27. Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 442-43 (2008).
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allowed massive volumes of data to be useful for ordinary criminal
investigations. 28 This section briefly sets out how big data will change
policing, focusing on two particular aspects of the change: (1) aggregation
and personalization of data collection, and (2) predictive analytics.
A. Aggregation and Personalization of Data Collection
Databases and data mining have been around for years. 29 Almost as
soon as computers developed the capacity to store information, analysts
have been seeking to use that information for their investigations.
Data mining is the process of looking for new knowledge in
existing data. The basic problem addressed by data mining is
turning low-level data, usually too voluminous to understand,
into higher forms (information or knowledge) that might be more
compact (for example, a summary), more abstract (for example,
a descriptive model), or more useful (for example, a predictive
model). 30
The move to big data is, thus, a change of degree, not kind, for
investigators. But it is a significant change. 31
In part, this change arises because the amount of data has continued to
increase. 32 Every public record, criminal record, and financial record is
collected by third party institutions. Direct marketers know things about
28. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 4, at 240.
29. Cate, supra note 27, at 438 (“‘Data mining’ is defined in many different ways but is
perhaps best understood as encompassing a wide spectrum of data-based activities ranging
from ‘subject-based’ searches for information on specified individuals to ‘pattern-based’
searches for unusual or predetermined patterns of activities or relationships.”); Slobogin,
supra note 6, at 317; see also Christopher Slobogin, Transactional Surveillance by the
Government, 75 MISS. L.J. 139, 144 (2005).
30. K. A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make
Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 22 (2003).
31. See Anita L. Allen, Privacy Law: Positive Theory and Normative Practice, 126
HARV. L. REV. F. 241, 246 (2013) (“‘Big Data’ is a nickname for enterprises that collect,
analyze, package, and sell data, even uninteresting-looking data, to reveal tastes, habits,
personality, and market behavior. Big Data is challenging traditional privacies.”).
32. Larry Port, Disconnect from Tech, LEGAL MGMT., Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 46, 49-50
(“Google records every click of every search result, your Linkedln and Facebook profiles,
including who you associate with, what products you like, and what entertainment you
enjoy . . . . If you read books on a Kindle, Amazon knows what books you’re reading, what
page you’re on in those books, and what you’ve deemed important via your highlights and
bookmarks. Any online retailer where you have an account knows what you’ve browsed and
bought.”).
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our personal lives before our friends and families do. 33 This growing
amount of data includes government, consumer, financial, health, and
internet records created by us (as users) and recorded by others about us.34
The change is not just the volume, but also the interconnectedness of the
information available in third party institutions. 35 Linking disparate data
sources into one easily searchable source has profound implications for the
ease of studying human activity (and criminality). New companies are
creating new industries to buy, sell, and study our data. 36 These data
aggregators purchase information from private third party institutions and
public record holders to create sophisticated consumer datasets for
marketing, insurance, and other purposes. 37
A byproduct of enhanced technological capabilities is the ease
with which data can be populated, aggregated, and exchanged
across an increasingly diverse set of corporate interests. These
corporate interests span the economy and include retailers
(Sears, Hallmark), pharmaceutical companies (Pfizer),
technology firms (Microsoft, IBM), banks and financial services
firms (Bank One, Bank of America), and automakers (GM,
Toyota). Data brokerage companies, such as Acxiom and

33. Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 2012, at MM30,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html.
34. Slobogin, supra note 29, at 145 (“[A]dvances in data warehousing and data
exchange technology in the financial sector allow very easy access to a virtual cornucopia of
transaction-related information that can reveal, among other things, ‘what products or
services you buy; what charities, political causes, or religious organizations you contribute
to; . . . where, with whom, and when you travel; how you spend your leisure time; . . .
whether you have unusual or dangerous hobbies; and even whether you participate in certain
felonious activities.’” (internal citations omitted)).
35. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 6, at 1185; Daniel J. Solove, Data
Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 343 (2008) [hereinafter
Data Mining].
36. Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L.
REV. 385, 389 (2012) (“Big data is closely linked both literally and by its scale to the
massive datasets compiled by well know [sic] data aggregators such as ChoicePoint or
Acxiom. Those datasets often start by aggregating large (but not ‘big’) structured sets
created by state, federal, and local governments, law enforcement, and financial institutions
amongst others. Acxiom is reported to hold data on five-hundred million consumers with an
average of 1500 data points per data subject.”).
37. Allen, supra note 31, at 246; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an
Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1699, 1733 (2008).
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LexisNexis repackage, augment, and sell personal data on
individuals to corporate and public sector clients.38
These private companies work with and sell information to law
enforcement. 39 In fact, law enforcement is an avid user of these
commercial data collections. 40 Adding to these private sources of
information, the government’s own organically developed data mining
projects supplement this privately collected data.41 The result is a valuable
source of investigatory information which federal and state police have
begun to use on a regular basis. 42
The aggregation of information allows for the targeting of particular
identified individuals and groups. For companies, the goal is an
individualized dossier of information about particular persons, groups, and
links among different persons. 43 Yet, this same dossier also offers clues to
law enforcement seeking information about particular suspects. Since
September 11, 2001, “[t]he DOJ, through the FBI, has been collecting
telephone logs, banking records, and other personal information regarding
thousands of Americans not only in connection with counterterrorism

38. Kline, supra note 23, at 447.
39. See Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281, 288.
40. See Gerry Smith, ATF Seeks ‘Massive’ Database for Faster Investigations,
HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 8, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/08/atf-database
_n_3038271.html (“The federal agency tasked with regulating firearms wants a new weapon
in its investigative arsenal: Big Data. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives is seeking proposals for ‘a massive online data repository system’ that could
allow agents to make faster connections between suspects’ names, social security numbers,
telephone numbers and utility bills . . . .”).
41. Cate, supra note 27, at 457 (“There are information aggregation businesses in the
private sector that already combine personal data from thousands of private-sector sources
and public records. . . . These records are updated daily by a steady stream of incoming data.
They provide a one-stop-shop for the government when it wants access to personal data, and
most of the government’s data mining initiatives depend on access to those data.”).
42. Id. at 444 (“The FBI aggregates data from multiple databases into its Investigative
Data Warehouse (‘IDW’). According to press briefings given by the FBI in 2006, the IDW
contains more than 659 million records, which come from 50 FBI and outside government
agency sources. The system’s data mining tools are so sophisticated that they can handle
many variations in names and other data, including up to twenty-nine variants of birth dates.
The 13,000 agents and analysts who use the system average one million queries a month.”);
Simpson, supra note 23, at A1.
43. Elspeth A. Brotherton, Comment, Big Brother Gets a Makeover: Behavioral
Targeting and the Third-Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 562-63 (2012); Simmons,
supra note 10, at 991.

2014]

BIG DATA DISTORTIONS

839

efforts, but also in furtherance of ordinary law enforcement.” 44 Public
records have been digitized so our addresses, employment, criminal
activities, and the like are available by a quick search using only a name or
identifying number.
Companies like Acxiom, Docusearch, ChoicePoint, and Oracle
can provide the inquirer with a wide array of data about any of
us, including basic demographic information, income, net worth,
real property holdings, social security number, current and
previous addresses, phone numbers and fax numbers, names of
neighbors, driver records, license plate and VIN numbers,
bankruptcy and debtor filings, employment, business and
criminal records, bank account balances and activity, stock
purchases, and credit card activity. 45
Law enforcement can, thus, quite quickly pull up information on
individuals from computers in the police station. 46 Creating a mosaic of
public, consumer, and health information about criminal suspects is simply
too useful for investigators not to take advantage of this new tool. As one
investigator stated, “Imagine the ability to instantly take a security camera
photograph from a bank robbery and match it using a facial recognition
algorithm to a photograph in an out-of-state motor vehicle database, and
then to link that person’s name to a mobile phone from a private-sector
marking database.” 47 In the future, once these different sets of data are
linked up, the result will be a very valuable integrated, individualized
investigative dossier that raises obvious privacy concerns. 48

44. Slobogin, supra note 6, at 319-20.
45. Id. at 320.
46. See Cate, supra note 27, at 442-43 (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation (‘FBI’)
maintains extensive databases in its Criminal Justice Information Services Division
(‘CJISD’) that collect data from, and supply data to, a wide array of public- and privatesector entities.”); see also The CJIS Division Turns 20, CJIS LINK, Mar. 2012, at 2, available
at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/cjis-link/march-2012/the-cjis-division-turns-20 (noting
that transactions with the FBI’s CJISD National Crime Information Center totaled 2.7 billion
searches in 2011).
47. Douglas Page, Crime Fighting’s Next Big Deal, OFFICER.COM (Sept. 9, 2012), http://
www.officer.com/article/10773317/crime-fightings-next-big-deal (quoting Philip Becnel,
managing partner of Dinolt, Becnel & Wells Investigative Group).
48. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 4, at 251 (“Big data poses big privacy risks. The
harvesting of large sets of personal data and the use of state of the art analytics implicate
growing privacy concerns.”).
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These public-private databases pale in comparison to what information
technology companies are learning about us from the internet and mobile
devices. 49 “Increasingly and of considerable importance going forward, big
data comes from less structured sources including ‘[w]eb-browsing data
trails, social network communications, sensor data and surveillance data.’
Much of it is ‘exhaust data,’ or data created unintentionally as a byproduct
of social networks, web searches, smartphones, and other online
behaviors.” 50 Google not only knows what you have bought, searched for,
and viewed online, but also has the ability to figure out where you have
been. 51 Of course, should third party institutions like Google partner with
credit card companies to know where you shop, 52 police license plate
readers to know where you drive, 53 social media to know your habits, 54 or
commercial aggregators to know your consumer history, 55 a rather
complete personal dossier with all of your personal preferences and patterns
could be created. This information would then be potentially available to
police investigating a particular person.56

49. Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2010,
at W1.
50. Terry, supra note 36, at 389-90 (internal citations omitted).
51. Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The Fourth Amendment in the Age of
Google, National Security and Digital Papers and Effects, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153,
163-64 (2011).
52. MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 4, at 85 (“Globally in 2008, there were 90 billion to
100 billion such transactions off line linkable to [point of sale] devices. Law enforcement
investigations regularly use such data to establish physical location.”).
53. Rushin, supra note 39, at 285-86 (“[Automatic License Plate Recognition] systems
not only flag passing cars that match a criminal database, but they also record the exact time
and location of all passing cars into a searchable database, whether or not there is any
evidence of wrongdoing. This data can be kept on file indefinitely. In communities with
extensive, integrated networks of ALPR cameras, this could potentially amount to mass
surveillance of an entire community.”).
54. See MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 4, at 89-90 (recognizing the data available when we
willingly join social networking programs, share geo-tagged photos, travel, use
neighborhood guides, or a multitude of other everyday activities).
55. Kline, supra note 23, at 447-48.
56. See, e.g., Editorial, The End of Privacy?, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012, at SR10; see
also Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 6, at 1138; Solove, Data Mining, supra
note 35, at 343-44; Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines,
2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 1454; Andy Greenberg, U.S. Government Requests for Google
Users’ Private Data Jump 37% in One Year, FORBES (June 17, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/06/17/u-s-government-requests-forgoogle-users-private-data -spike-37-in-one-year/.
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The LEATPR Standards recognize the new world of data collection.
But, the next stage—the future of big data policing—will be when each of
those datasets are linked together into large commercial databases that
upend any ability to categorize the content of the data. Traditional
categories of “health records” or “financial records” will not be limited to a
single dataset of that type of record, but blended with other types of
information.
For purposes of this article, the aggregation of disparate databases
collecting public and private information on individuals offers two issues to
study. First, the types and sources of information included in these
aggregated databases include all sorts of private and not-so-private
information combined together. Isolating the level of privacy in a particular
database might be possible in single use databases (phone records, financial
records, health records), but becomes more difficult in an aggregated
dataset that includes portions of all of these types of records. Second,
commercial aggregators add a level of distance between the parties. As
Joshua Simmons has written, some third party institutions are best thought
of as “Fourth Parties” who have no relationship to the data except that they
purchased it. 57 Unlike third parties who have some contractual relationship
with the provider (i.e., phone company to phone consumer), these
commercial purchasers of data possess the data simply as a commodity. 58
Finally, as a related concern, there is the technical reality that these Fourth
Parties will soon be storing their data on cloud-computing systems hosted
by yet another party (Fifth Parties?), which raises the question of whether
this location also weakens the protections against law enforcement access. 59
After all, if police can ask the host for access to the information stored, why
do they need to ask permission from the owner or custodian of the
information?
B. Aggregation and Prediction
Aggregation of information also facilitates the creation of new
prediction-based techniques to investigate crimes. Pattern matching
algorithms that flag suspicious consumer purchases (fertilizer to build
bombs, pseudoephedrine to make methamphetamine, etc.) allow police to
spot (or prevent) crimes without any previous knowledge that the crime is

57. Simmons, supra note 10, at 990.
58. Id.
59. Joshua Gruenspecht, Note, “Reasonable” Grand Jury Subpoenas: Asking for
Information in the Age of Big Data, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 543, 548-49 (2011).
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occurring. 60 Predictive analytics have already been used to determine areas
where crime may occur, 61 but new predictive technologies will soon look to
predict who will be committing those crimes.
Third party records also allow law enforcement to recognize new
patterns of criminal activities in the data. Police can determine social
connections or links, visualizing who a particular criminal’s associates
might be. 62 Police can create profiles of suspects by matching behavior
patterns to repeated crimes 63 or offender networks. 64 Police can determine
travel patterns and activities of known criminals. 65 Police can determine
the location of particular types of crimes, narrowed to particular geographic
areas. 66 This pattern matching thus shifts the focus of investigation from a
reactive approach67 to a more forward-thinking, predictive approach that is
all based on the accumulated data. 68
This type of predictive searching presents difficult issues that the
LEATPR Standards will need to address. The first involves the practice of
generalized pattern matching searches conducted without any particularized
suspicion. As the LEATPR Standards suggest, such searches should only
be allowed if the identifying information in the data is removed (or
hidden). 69 This process of making the identifying data anonymous offers
one level of protection. However, it is not a very fulsome protection, as de60. Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 830 (2010).
61. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62
EMORY L. J. 259, 267 (2012).
62. Gareth Cook, Software Helps Police Draw Crime Links, BOS. GLOBE, July 17, 2003,
at A1.
63. Vikas Grover, Richard Adderley, & Max Bramer, Review of Current Crime
Prediction Techniques, in APPLICATIONS AND INNOVATIONS IN INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS XIV
233 (Richard Ellis et al. eds., 2007).
64. Id. (“Data is not just a record of crimes, it also contains valuable information that
could be used to link crime scenes based on the modus operandi (MO) of the offender(s),
suggest which offenders may be responsible for the crime and also identify those offenders
who work in teams (offender networks) . . . .”).
65. Murphy, supra note 60, at 830 (“But the use of databases to generate suspects
represents a new kind of investigation altogether—whether based on particular information
(e.g., ‘who called this number’) or upon predefined algorithms (e.g., ‘who has traveled to
these three countries and bought these two items within a one month period’).”).
66. Bernhard Warner, Google Turns to Big Data to Unmask Human Traffickers,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/201304-10/google-turns-to-big-data-to-unmask-human-traffickers.
67. Cook, supra note 62, at A1; Sullivan, supra note 22.
68. Block, supra note 22, at A4.
69. See STANDARD 25-5.6.
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identified data can easily be re-identified (either directly by requesting the
identity of the target or through a process of connecting the dots with other
data). 70 In addition, as will be discussed in the next few sections, the
traditional legal categories of protection (relevance, reasonable suspicion,
probable cause) that might prevent police from re-identifying the
individuals behind the suspicious patterns offer little protection in the era of
big data.
C. The Big Data Lure
There is much more that could be said about how big data may affect law
enforcement’s relationship with third party records. The preceding brief
summary seeks only to tease out some of the concerns that regulation of
access to third party records must confront in a changing technological
landscape.
Before moving on with my analysis of how the LEATPR Standards may
be affected by big data policing, it is important to acknowledge the
incredible promise that big data offers law enforcement. Big data is an
important innovation because it offers novel solutions to age old problems.
The move toward “smart-policing” or “data-driven policing” is not mere
hype, 71 but also recognition that many traditional police techniques lacked
empirical support. 72 In trusting the numbers, police departments have seen
dramatic improvement in crime suppression.73 Whether this improvement
is a direct result of the use of data is still an open question, but the
correlation certainly exists. 74

70. See infra Part II.C.1.
71. Although, in truth, there may be some measure of hype with these new technologies.
See, e.g., Guy Adams, LAPD’s Sci-Fi Solution to Real Crime, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 11, 2012,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/lapds-scifi-solution-to-real-crime-6287
800.html; Joel Rubin, Stopping Crime Before It Starts, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2010, http://
articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/21/local/la-me-predictcrime-20100427-1.
72. Nina Cope, ‘Intelligence Led Policing or Policing Led Intelligence?’: Integrating
Volume Crime Analysis into Policing, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 188, 191 (2004); DAVID
ALAN SKLANSKY, THE PERSISTENT PULL OF POLICE PROFESSIONALISM 4 (Mar. 20011) (from a
series of papers titled “New Perspectives in Policing,” published on behalf of the John F.
Kennedy School of Government Executive Session on Policing & Public Safety, and the
National Institute of Justice.)
73. James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastofsky & David Weisburd, Making Sense of
COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of Organizational Change in Three Police
Departments, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 147, 172 (2007).
74. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 3, at 70-72 (discussing how
correlation may replace hypothesis in an era of big data).
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In part, because this lure of big data is so great, those who study it must
be vigilant in asking difficult questions. Police will benefit from access to
the data, and thus, they will seek ways to access it. The LEATPR
Standards acknowledge this reality and create a rather permissive process
that generally allows law enforcement access. The next Part assesses
whether the reality of big data, by distorting some of the traditional legal
protections, weakens the Standards too much. Part III of this article will
then seek to offer some suggestions in response to these concerns.
II. The LEATPR Standards and Big Data
The LEATPR Standards, of course, directly address the rise of
centralized sources of personal information included in third party records.
Necessarily, the “institutional third party” defined in Standard 25-1.1(e)
contemplates private and corporate entities compiling personal data about
individuals. 75 The question, however, is whether the existing Standards
accurately speak to the new world of commercial big data, aggregated data,
and the valuable information in de-identified data searches. This Part
proceeds in three steps. First, it examines how the chosen terminology in
the Standards may become distorted by the availability of big data. Second,
it looks at the phenomenon of blended records that arise when corporate
and other entities collect, aggregate, and merge various third party records
into one large megadatabase. Third, it discusses how the LEATPR
Standards might apply to large scale predictive pattern searches used to
identify unknown suspects and even unknown crimes from large deidentified datasets. This Part attempts to show that big data has a distorting
effect, altering both the strength of the categories of protection and the
ability to access the records available. The point is not to criticize, but to
refine the Standards in the face of these larger societal and technological
changes brought on by big data.
A. The LEATPR Standards and Language
Central to the logic of the LEATPR Standards is the interrelation
between the level of privacy associated with the categories of information76
and the level of authorization needed to access that information.77 The
chosen levels of authorization mirror well-established Fourth Amendment
and criminal procedure terms of art—relevancy, reasonable suspicion, and
75. See STANDARD 25-1.1(e).
76. See STANDARD 25-4.1.
77. See STANDARD 25-4.2.
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probable cause. Yet, one question that must be asked is whether these
traditional categories of suspicion become distorted in an era of big data. If
so, the protection they seemingly (or traditionally) provide may not be
sufficiently robust to protect individuals’ private information.
In many cases, the LEATPR Standards provide a workable model to
address basic law enforcement needs. For traditional investigations, the
categories of information (Standard 25-4.1) and the categories of protection
(Standard 25-4.2) will be fairly easy to analyze. 78 As set out in the
examples section of the LEATPR Standards’ Introduction,79 if police are
aware of a particular crime (a shooting in a park), their ability to search
particular records of identified suspects (phone records, financial records)
will turn on the level of privacy protection granted to those third party
records. 80 In the park-shooting example, obtaining the phone records of the
9-1-1 caller, because of the “minimally private” nature of the call, would be
permissible if supported by a statement that the evidence is relevant to an
investigation.81
The key is the term “relevant,” which brings up the first point of caution.
The legal categories of protection—namely, the standards of relevancy,
reasonable suspicion, and probable cause—become weakened in a world of
big data. What I seek to point out is that the LEATPR Standards’ chosen
terminology, borrowed from Fourth Amendment doctrine, is less protective
in application because the amount of aggregated, networked information
now available distorts the analysis. The next three subparts explain how
more information makes it easier to meet these legal thresholds, and thus,
easier to justify access to the information that is sought.
1. Big Data Distortions of Relevancy
Relevance is understood as perhaps the lowest threshold to obtain
information. 82 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is relevant if
“it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be

78. See STANDARD 25-4.1, 25-4.2.
79. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 11.
80. See STANDARD 25-5.2, 25-5.3.
81. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 12-13 (discussing the privacy level of
phone records in the 9-1-1 shooting hypothetical).
82. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 345 (1985) (“[I]t is universally recognized
that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate fact in
issue, but only have ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.’” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 401)).
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without the evidence.” 83 In practice, there is little required to obtain
Courts routinely find
information under such a low threshold. 84
information relevant. Most recently, in the high profile case involving the
relevance of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) access to volumes of
telephone metadata, the reviewing court essentially held that the records
were relevant because the government argued they were relevant. 85
Relevance makes its appearance in Standard 25-5.2(a)(iii), authorizing
access to a record based on “a judicial determination that the record is
relevant to an investigation,” 86 or, in Standard 25-5.3(a)(iv), based on “a
prosecutorial certification that the record is relevant to an investigation.” 87
In both situations, the category of justification (relevance) covers
“moderately protected information” or “minimally protected information,”
depending on whether the adopting jurisdiction chooses to require Standard
25-5.3(a)(ii), 25-5.3(a)(iii), or 25-5.3(a)(iv) as its guide. 88
How does big data help expand the reach of relevancy? First, the sheer
amount of personal information available to search in third party records
presents new opportunities for police to expand their searches about
suspects. There are simply more possible sources for which to search under
a relevancy standard, because more information is available in big
databases. If police believe someone is selling drugs, all sorts of things
might be “relevant” to that suspicion: financial records, travel patterns,
associates, substance abuse issues or treatment, consumer purchases, phone
calls, etc. Many of these data points were simply not easily available to
search before the advent of big data because they were not collected in
widely accessible computer networks. In addition, there is a qualitative

83. FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.”).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Sumner, 522 Fed. App’x 806, 810 (11th Cir. 2013)
(“Relevance under the Federal Rules of Evidence is a low standard . . . .”).
85. See In re Application of F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Production of Tangible
Things From [Redacted], No. BR 13-109, 2013 WL 5307991 (Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Ct. Sept. 13, 2013) (“This Court recognizes that the concept of relevance here
is in fact broad and amounts to a relatively low standard. Where there is no requirement for
specific and articulable facts or materiality, the government may meet the standard under
Section 215 if it can demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought
to be produced has some bearing on its investigations of the identified international terrorist
organizations.”).
86. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(iii).
87. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(iv).
88. See STANDARD 25-5.3(a).
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change, as inference builds upon inference toward suspicion. Information
creates links, clues, and suspicions that, even if focused on innocent
correlations, might suggest criminal activity. If the target texted a known
drug dealer, it could be an incriminating clue linking him to a conspiracy,
or it could just be a contact with an old friend. If the target parked outside a
known drug house, it could be an incriminating clue proving his
involvement in delivering drugs, or just a coincidence of geography. But,
under a relevance standard for investigation, these facts would be relevant
to building a case.
For example, assume that in the park-shooting example, the 9-1-1 caller
was identified by a telephone number through call records. Once identified,
police could run the telephone number through national databases to find
out a name, addresses, prior criminal records, prior arrests, and, most
interestingly, if the phone number had previously been associated with gun
violence. 89 These datasets are not private and are under the government’s
control. Further, with a name and the connection to the shooting, police
might be able to request more detailed information about the 9-1-1 caller on
relevancy grounds. A judge might sign off on a relevancy request to search
databases that include minimally or moderately private information to see if
the individual had any connection with the shooting (beyond being a
witness). A judge might also allow police to request twenty-four hours of
geolocational data tracking the witness’ whereabouts. 90 Or, simply because
of the type of crime at issue, certain searches of consumer purchases might
be considered relevant to the investigation. Police might wish to access
local companies’ sales receipts or the witness’ credit card receipts to see if
the witness purchased the type of ammunition used in the shooting. Again,
this type of search for minimally or moderately private information would
be relevant to investigate the shooting, even if it only happened to reveal
innocent information.
The questions get even harder in the context of mass searches.
Continuing with the shooting example, assume police know that thirty
people were present at the shooting. Presumably, if every one of those
thirty potential witnesses has a cell phone or a smartphone, it might be
possible to identify all of the phones that were in the park when the

89. See National Crime Information Center (NCIC), FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (June 2,
2008), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/is/ncic.htm.
90. Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance After United
States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY, 803, 820 (2013) (applying the Standards to location data).
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shooting occurred. 91 Under the Standard 25-4.1 categories, the identifying
numbers and names would only be minimally private and thus available
with a Standard 25-4.2 relevancy showing. 92 Therefore, without any
evidence of criminal wrongdoing, the identity and whereabouts of thirty
individuals will become known to investigating officers. After all, what
these witnesses know (or do not know) is relevant to the investigation. This
alone presents a slightly more concerning situation than the 9-1-1 caller
who self-identified his whereabouts to the police. People who have no
association with the crime will be tracked to a particular place at a
particular time without any individualized suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing.
Mass surveillance without evidence of particularized criminal
wrongdoing certainly raises Fourth Amendment questions.93 But, it also
raises concerns under the LEATPR Standards. Does a person’s mere
presence in a park along with thirty other people at the time of a shooting
make her personal information relevant to an investigation? Could police
search law enforcement databases to find out if the telephone numbers
correspond with a person in their police databases (or if the number is listed
publicly)? Could law enforcement search to see if any of these witnesses
have a criminal record? Could police search large data aggregators to find
out if the names overlapped at all with the name of the victim
(addresses/jobs/associations)? Could they search other phone contacts to
see if these numbers provide any connection or motive to the shooting?
The answer to each of these questions is likely yes under the LEATPR
Standards (since none of these are highly protected data sets). Notice that
by merely being proximate to a crime, the idea of relevancy has expanded
to greater and greater access to personal information. Add to that the
phenomenon of “confirmation bias,” whereby individuals see what they
expect to see, and police (unintentionally or intentionally) may create an

91. Tsukayama, supra note 25, at A13; Sullivan, supra note 22; Wolverton, supra note
25.
92. See STANDARD 25-4.1, 25.4-2.
93. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Should government
someday decide to institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it will
be time enough to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted to treat such
surveillance as a search.”), abrogated by United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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ever-widening web of suspicion. 94 In the hunt for suspicious links, many
more things will appear suspicious. 95
One larger question for the LEATPR Standards might be whether the
term “relevant” provides any real limitation at all. If relevance is the only
limitation, it seems likely that in practice the minimally-moderately
protected and not protected categories will merge into one category of
readily accessible information. Simply stated, if police can conduct mass
searches of location and identity based on any reported crime, then the
relevancy standard is revealed to offer very little protection.
2. Big Data Distortions of Reasonable Suspicion
Reasonable suspicion is a well-established Fourth Amendment term of
art, used in thousands of federal and state cases. 96 In the LEATPR
Standards, it has been adopted as one of the types of authorization for
moderately private records. Standard 25-5.2(a)(ii) requires “a judicial
determination that there is reasonable suspicion to believe the information
in the record contains or will lead to evidence of crime,” 97 and Standard 255.3(a)(ii) connects that requirement to moderately private records. 98
The effect of big data is apparent in any analysis of reasonable suspicion.
As I have explored in a separate article, reasonable suspicion is essentially a
“small data doctrine.” 99 From Terry v. Ohio onwards, reasonable suspicion
has derived from cases involving police officers observing unknown
suspects with little information about the suspect.100 These are small data
observations. And, as a doctrine built on cases involving unknown suspects
with small data points about observable actions, the reasonable suspicion
threshold makes sense. But, as more information about the suspect is
provided to the officer, the easier the reasonable suspicion threshold is to

94. Barbara O’Brien, Prime Suspect: An Examination of Factors that Aggravate and
Counteract Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
315, 315 (2009).
95. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski,
J., concurring) (“Just as a man with a hammer sees every problem as a nail, so a man with a
badge may see every corner of his beat as a high crime area.”).
96. A Westlaw search of “reasonable suspicion” in the same sentence as “Fourth
Amendment” returns over 10,000 results.
97. See STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(ii).
98. See STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(ii).
99. Ferguson, supra note 18.
100. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968).
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meet. 101 This becomes apparent by looking at how the Supreme Court has
evaluated particularized information in the totality of circumstances
analysis. 102 It can also be seen in how courts routinely find reasonable
suspicion when more information about an identified suspect is added to the
analysis. 103 And, almost universally, in cases with “known suspects” there
is a finding of reasonable suspicion. 104 Simply put, the more information
known about a suspect, the easier it is to justify a finding of reasonable
suspicion.
The move from small data to big data can be significant. Big data—and
the ability to know all sorts of personal details about the suspect—weakens
the protections of reasonable suspicion. An otherwise innocent observation
of a parked car in a motel lot with out-of-state license plates can turn into
reasonable suspicion if the license plate identifies the car’s owner as a
suspected drug dealer who is listed in a database of known drug suspects. 105
Or, a man with a bag lurking outside a darkened home can give rise to
reasonable suspicion if the suspect is in an area predicted to be
burglarized. 106 The suspect has done nothing different, but the suspicion
changes because the officer has been able to obtain more contextualizing
information. 107
101. As will be discussed, this is both because the information is particularized and
individualized, mirroring the language in Terry, and because there is simply more
information available.
102. Compare Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (holding that the information in
an anonymous tip was not enough to create reasonable suspicion), with Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (finding an anonymous tip, coupled with further police
investigation, provided enough to create reasonable suspicion).
103. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996); United States v. Sokolow, 490
U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
104. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Calderon, 681 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (Mass. App. Ct.
1997); State v. Gilchrist, 299 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Minn. 1980); State v. Valentine, 636 A.2d
505, 510-511 (N.J. 1994).
105. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695.
106. Will Frampton, With New Software, Norcross Police Practice Predictive Policing,
CBS ATLANTA (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.cbsatlanta.com/story/23178208/with-newsoftware-norcross-police-utilize-predictive-policing.
107. Again the phenomenon of confirmation bias plays a role here. Keith A. Findley,
Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38
SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 899 (2008) (“Confirmation bias means that police and
prosecutors―as human beings―are likely, once they have identified a suspect or formed a
theory of guilt, to seek confirming evidence and not seek disconfirming evidence.
Accordingly, any ambiguous evidence is likely to be construed as incriminating, any
incriminating evidence is likely to be viewed with heightened significance, and any
inconsistent evidence is likely to be ignored or marginalized as insignificant or unreliable.”).
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In addition, the number of data points can affect reasonable suspicion.
Similar to the quantification argument with relevancy, sometimes the sheer
quantity of facts can satisfy the totality of circumstances test even if those
data points are otherwise innocent.108 Once an officer identifies the
suspect, big data gives the officer access to a wealth of information with
which to justify reasonable suspicion. The point here is simply that the
choice of “reasonable suspicion” terminology may not be as protective as it
seems.
Again, going back to our shooting example, to figure out if the 9-1-1
caller was involved in the shooting, police may want to consider possible
motives for the crime. Police may wish to figure out if the 9-1-1 caller and
the victim have any personal or business connections. To establish (or rule
out) a financial motive to the shooting (robbery, bad debts, etc.), police may
wish to access the moderately protected financial records of the 9-1-1 caller
(or any of the other witnesses) to see if a sum of money had been
transferred. To develop reasonable suspicion in a big data world, certain
database searches could be conducted on mere relevancy grounds. 109 Law
enforcement searches could identify past addresses, employment, or other
available records. If any data showed a match between the victim and the
suspect, this might establish a personal or business connection. Data
searches into stored automobile license plate readers might reveal the
overlapping movements of the 9-1-1 caller and the victim. If there was any
geographical link, this might signify a personal connection. If police
suspected that the 9-1-1 caller was the shooter, consumer searches into past
ammunition or gun purchases would certainly satisfy the relevancy
standard, though possibly implicate only innocent conduct. Aggregating
these data points may well create reasonable suspicion to believe that other
records may lead to evidence of a crime, which would allow even more
invasive searches in other databases containing moderately private
information.
Again, notice that the 9-1-1 caller has not done anything more than
report a crime. Yet, police can develop (rightly or wrongly) reasonable
suspicion based on connecting information (that may well be innocent).
This is the reality of big data. The more information gathered, the easier it
is to generate suspicion. As will be discussed, this weakness of the
108. The Supreme Court has never adopted a numbers approach to reasonable suspicion,
although in cases like United States v. Arvizu, the sheer number of factors, even if each
factor was itself innocent, was found to be sufficient to find reasonable suspicion. 534 U.S.
266, 277 (2002).
109. See supra Part II.A.1.
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reasonable suspicion standard reveals a weakness in the LEATPR
Standards that have adopted the same terminology.
3. Big Data Distortions for Probable Cause
Probable cause remains a constitutionally rooted threshold requirement
that “exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”110 Under Standard 255.2, “a judicial determination that there is probable cause to believe the
information in the record contains or will lead to evidence of crime” is
required for “highly protected information.” 111
Probable cause, as a term of art, may be the least affected by big data,
because probable cause has always been a standard requiring significant
information. While big data provides more tools to collect this information,
and likely makes the standard easier to meet, it does not fundamentally
change the analysis.
Take, for example, the seminal probable cause case Illinois v. Gates. 112
In Gates, police received an anonymous letter stating that Sue and Lance
Gates were involved in distributing drugs. 113 Further, the letter provided
details about the Gates’ impending trip to Florida to retrieve the drugs and
drive them back to Illinois. 114 Police officers followed Mr. Gates and
discovered that many of the plans detailed in the anonymous tip had in fact
occurred. 115 With this corroborated information, police officers requested a
search warrant. 116 In finding that police observations corroborated the
anonymous tip, the Supreme Court upheld the finding of probable cause
under a totality of circumstances test.117
110. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)); see also Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013)
(“The test for probable cause is not reducible to ‘precise definition or quantification.’
‘Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of
the evidence . . . have no place in the [probable-cause] decision.’ All we have required is the
kind of ‘fair probability’ on which ‘reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians,
act.’” (internal citations omitted)).
111. See STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(i), 25-5.3(a)(i).
112. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
113. Id. at 225.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 226.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 238.
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Now, imagine Gates in an era of big data searches. With the reasonable
suspicion provided by the tip, police could have obtained financial
information that might show a discrepancy in the amount of money earned
and the family’s purchases. 118 Police could obtain the past flight history of
Mr. Gates who was apparently repeating this travel pattern with some
frequency. 119 Police could also obtain limited geolocational details of the
Gates’ car, identify the visitors to the Gates’ Florida home (and determine
whether they were known to be involved in the drug trade), or compare the
phone numbers Gates called to known drug distributers, etc. These data
searches could well replace the corroboration provided by following Mr.
Gates to Florida and could be done rather efficiently with a computer at the
police station. These facts would also likely support a claim of probable
cause.
This is not to say that big data changes the traditional probable cause
analysis, except in that it makes it easier to reach the probable cause
threshold. New interconnected resources will be able to fill in the gaps of
information and provide a seemingly stronger set of facts to base a finding
of probable cause. 120 New information sources will alter the probabilities
that criminal activity is occurring. Probable cause simply becomes more
attainable with more information.
The expansion of information sources may well be a positive innovation,
as it also likely means that the probable cause established in many cases
will be stronger. The risk is merely that, just as in the reasonable suspicion
analysis, quantity replaces quality under a totality of circumstances test.
These distortions in the terminology suggest a possible corrective
solution—namely, alter the terminology in the Standards to reflect the
accurate protective scope envisioned by the drafters. Probable cause, in
fact, may be a more appropriate standard in a big data world that has eroded
the justifications of lesser protections. As will be discussed in Part III,
these changes need not be major, but may be necessary.
118. This financial information is likely moderately private information accessible under
Standard 25-5.3(a)(ii).
119. This travel information may not be private at all. See Susan Stellin, Security Check
Now Starts Long Before You Fly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2013, at A1 (“The Transportation
Security Administration is expanding its screening of passengers before they arrive at the
airport by searching a wide array of government and private databases that can include
records like car registrations and employment information.”).
120. See, e.g., Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 913, 913 (2009); Lawrence Rosenthal, Probability, Probable Cause, and the Law of
Unintended Consequences, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 63, 63 (2009), http://www.texaslrev.
com/wp-content/uploads/Rosenthal-87-TLRSA-63.pdf.
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B. The LEATPR Standards and Aggregation of Records
Big data means big money because the information collected on
consumers is valuable to companies. 121 One of the realities of big data is
that unique datasets are being aggregated into massive commercial and
public databases. This aggregation means that numerous types of highly
private and nonprivate information are mingled in the same blended
database. 122 This change has the potential to fundamentally alter how we
think of third party records. In the future, centralized third party records
filled with personalized information may exist as a commodity sold by data
brokers making the records easily accessible to law enforcement and others
who are willing to pay for the information.
In many ways, the future is now, as commercial enterprises are collecting
everything from private health information and financial credit reports, to
more public interactions with law enforcement and government institutions.
Data brokers represent merely the beginning of companies seeking to make
a profit from merging all sorts of private and public information. 123
Facebook, Amazon, and other social media and commercial sites are
already capitalizing on the highly personal information they know about
users by selling it to marketers. 124 This vast amount of information—easily
searchable for all sorts of reasons—will only grow in sophistication.125
121. John Furrier, Big Data Is Big Market and Big Business - $50 Billion Market by
2017, FORBES (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/siliconangle/2012/02/17/bigdata-is-big-market-big-business/ (announcing the Wikibon prediction that big data will be a
$50 billion industry by the year 2017).
122. See supra Part I.A.
123. Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know About You,
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-aboutwhat-data-brokers-know-about-you; see also Robert Epstein, Google’s Gotcha: Fifteen
Ways Google Monitors You, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (May 10, 2013), http://www.
usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/05/10/15-ways-google-monitors-you (“Google uses your
search history to send you personalized ads. That’s how it survives, after all. About 97
percent of the company’s revenues are from advertising.”).
124. Kashmir Hill, Facebook Joins Forces with Data Brokers to Gain More Intel About
Users for Ads, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/02/27/
facebook-joins-forces-with-data-brokers-to-gather-more-intel-about-users-for-ads/; Marcus
Wohlsen, Amazon’s Next Big Business Is Selling You, WIRED MAG. (Oct. 16, 2012), http://
www.wired.com/business/2012/10/amazon-next-advertising-giant/.
125. Leslie Cauley, Google’s G1 Phone Makes It Easy to Track Surfing Habits, USA
TODAY, Feb. 10, 2009, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/wireless/phones/2009-02-08google-g1-web-tracking-privacy_N.htm?csp=15; Epstein, supra note 123 (“Every search
you conduct using Google’s ubiquitous search engine – for medical or mental health
information, an update on your favorite mayoral candidate, the schedule of your church’s
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Law enforcement can now purchase access to some commercial databases
and aggregated datasets, and the resulting datasets which they can then
search with a single query are becoming incredibly valuable for
investigations.
This aggregation of many third party institutions’ data, into what has
been called “fourth party” aggregators, 126 distorts the Standards in two
ways. First, it challenges the level of privacy that should be given to this
aggregated megadatabase (which includes private and nonprivate
information). Second, it challenges the level of justification needed for
access to these aggregated, blended records. The LEATPR Standards
recognize these problems. 127 They suggest: “If different types of content
are commingled in a single record, as will often be the case, then the
protection afforded to that record should be dictated by the most private
type of information contained therein.” 128 But, taken seriously, that means
that records of many of these fourth party institutions might be off limits to
law enforcement without the highest level of justification. Such a result is
likely not the intended result of the drafters, but does arise because of the
distortions of aggregated big data.
1. Blended Privacy in Records
The first issue is whether an aggregated, blended record (including
highly private and nonprivate information) changes the level of privacy for
the entire records dataset. In other words, does the fact that a highly private
record is included in a larger database of records distort the level of privacy
under the Standards? For purposes of this article, an aggregated, blended
record is defined as the type of massive dataset collected by commercial
companies whose central goal is to collect as much information about a
person as possible.
There are two reasons why aggregation might change the privacy
analysis. The first is that it might distort the meaning of “record.”
Remember, the key to the LEATPR Standards is that one must first
determine the appropriate level of privacy for the records at issue.129 But,
potluck dinner, how to handle kids’ tantrums, the cure for halitosis or the latest sex toys –
allows the company to track your interests and, over time, build a detailed dossier that
describes virtually every aspect of your character, food preferences, religious beliefs,
medical problems, sexual inclinations, parenting challenges, political leanings and so on.”).
126. See Simmons, supra note 10.
127. See STANDARD 25-4.2(a) commentary.
128. Id.
129. STANDARD 25-4.2(a).
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in an aggregated, blended dataset, what is the “record” for which you are
determining privacy?
For example, if a specific highly private health checklist necessary to get
life insurance is combined with other less private information relevant to
the insurance company, is the “record” the health checklist or the entire
personal file with all of the information (health, financial, personal) owned
by the insurance company? If it is the former, then the privacy levels in the
Standards work without much difficulty (the health checklist might be
designated highly private, but other parts of the file would not be). But, if
the “record” is the entire dataset on the individual (the insurance records),
then the record might not be clearly highly private and may include
nonprivate information. Said another way, if the individual’s insurance
records are combined with financial, personal, or consumer information in
one massive, aggregated database, is a query into that database (a) a single
search of a single record (i.e., the entire composite file on the person), or (b)
several different searches of different types of records?
In terms of establishing what a “record” means, the LEATPR Standards
offer the following definition: “A ‘record’ contains information, whether
maintained in paper, electronic, or other form, that is linked, or is linkable
through reasonable efforts, to an identifiable person.” 130 This broad
definition does not resolve the question of whether an aggregated, blended
dataset is a single record or a series of records. The specific health
checklist, the complete life insurance file, and the other personal
information are all linkable to an identified person, and thus all would be
considered records under Standard 25-1.1(g).
Of course, the term “records” is used hundreds of times throughout the
LEATPR Standards and is understood to include both narrow and broad
conceptions depending on the context. If this is correct, then blended,
aggregated datasets held by big data companies can be considered the type
of “record” covered by the Standards. But, the level of privacy in that
single record that contains lots of different types of information is quite
difficult to fathom. As will be discussed in the next section, without a clear
idea of the level of privacy in the aggregated dataset, the level of
justification police need to access that information is quite difficult to
determine.
Second, there is the issue of commodification. If I give my personal
information to my insurance company in order to get health insurance, does
the private nature of this information change when it is sold to a series of
130. STANDARD 25-1.1(g).
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larger data aggregators? Or, in other words, does the commodification of
my personal data change the level of privacy in that data? 131 If dozens of
drug companies not only know, but have purchased these highly private
facts about my health, can I still claim that they are highly private?
The LEATPR Standards provide a four factor test to determine the level
of privacy in records. This privacy level is determined by looking at
whether
(a) the initial transfer of such information to an institutional third
party is reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully in
society or commerce, or is socially beneficial, including to
freedom of speech and association; (b) such information is
personal, including the extent to which it is intimate and likely to
cause embarrassment or stigma if disclosed, and whether outside
of the initial transfer to an institutional third party it is typically
disclosed only within one’s close social network, if at all; (c)
such information is accessible to and accessed by nongovernment person outside the institutional third party; and (d)
existing law, including the law of privilege, restricts or allows
access to and dissemination of such information or of
comparable information.132
The first two factors are not affected by the commodification of data.
The first factor focuses on the initial transfer of such information. By
definition, subsequent transfers (to fourth parties) should not alter the
analysis. The second factor seems to be referring to intimate information
that is not usually disclosed outside a close social network by the individual
person. The transfer of information to additional third or fourth party
aggregators would not affect this factor.
The third and fourth factors, however, may be affected by the blending
and selling of private data to commercial aggregators. If information is
sold or merged into large databases, the information will be accessible and
accessed by additional institutional third parties.133 Thus, looking at the
131. Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055,
2057 (2004) (“[A] strong conception of personal data as a commodity is emerging in the
United States, and individual Americans are already participating in the commodification of
their personal data.”).
132. See STANDARD 25-4.1(a)-(d).
133. Angwin, supra note 49, at W1 (“Hidden inside Ashley Hayes-Beaty’s computer, a
tiny file helps gather personal details about her, all to be put up for sale for a tenth of a
penny. The file consists of a single code—4c812db292272995e5416a323e79bd37—that
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third factor, the act of selling the information to a fourth party aggregator
(or fifth party, etc.) will cut against the claim of privacy under the
definition, even though the individual identified in or linked to the private
information has not done anything differently. Perhaps this makes some
sense. If for example, the information about a person’s ill health (through
insurance rates or premiums) is available in half a dozen commercial
databases, then why should there not be a lessened sense of privacy?
The fourth factor may also be affected because the laws that prevent
institutional third parties from revealing information do not always reach
fourth parties. 134 Law enforcement agents may be restricted from obtaining
consumer information directly from a drug store (without lawful authority),
but they may be able to obtain the same information through a commercial
aggregator (or direct marketer) that purchased the same information from
the drug store. Currently, the only regulation on law enforcement is on the
direct access of the information, and not the commercial purchase of the
same information. Thus, the lack of law or regulation covering these big
data collections may undermine a claim of privacy under the Standards.
Commodification, thus, seems to affect two of the factors for evaluating
the level of privacy. As third party records become a more valuable
commodity, this trading of information could affect the level of privacy in
those records. Finally, the financial reality that data is a commodity seems
to undercut the sense that this information has a strong claim to privacy.
Perhaps this is an insight best saved for another forum, but underlying the
debate over privacy is the deeper question: Whose data is it? If I buy goods
from Apple and Amazon, is the data about those purchases mine or the
companies’? 135 If Amazon sells this information, why can I claim any
privacy in it? Perhaps, for business or reputation reasons, the company
should not sell the information, but the question is could they? If I
regularly telephone a depression hotline number, is that information private
such that my phone company cannot sell my name to a marketer of
antidepressants? Under the LEATPR Standards’ factors, both types of
information would have some type of privacy protection, but the analysis
seems to ignore that the particular third parties are commercial businesses
secretly identifies her as a 26-year-old female in Nashville, Tenn. The code knows that her
favorite movies include ‘The Princess Bride,’ ‘50 First Dates’ and ‘10 Things I Hate About
You.’ It knows she enjoys the ‘Sex and the City’ series. It knows she browses entertainment
news and likes to take quizzes.”).
134. Simmons, supra note 10, at 951.
135. Larry Downes, Privacy Panic Debate: Whose Data Is It?, CNET (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20057682-38.html.
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who have an interest in maximizing their profits. If it is the companies’
data as well as mine, why can they not sell it to the highest bidder including
law enforcement agencies that want to use the information for criminal
investigations?
To be clear, these are not omissions in the Standards, but merely
distortions that arise when personal information becomes a commodity and
is blended by large big data companies owning multiple, integrated
databases.
2. Blending Justifications
The second inquiry involves how to evaluate the level of justification
needed to access a large, aggregated database. Police are not always
looking for a discrete fact in a database, but many times would like the
entire composite picture. If health insurance information (fairly private) is
mixed with home purchases (not private), and financial records (some
private, some not) are mixed with consumer purchases (some private, some
not), how can a law enforcement agent calibrate the appropriate level of
justification to search?
The Standards suggest that the default is to require the level of
justification for the most private information in the database.136 Under the
LEATPR Standard 25-4.2(a), “[i]f a record contains different types of
information, it should be afforded the level of protection appropriate for the
most private type it contains.”137 Thus, if there was any highly private
information in the dataset, the commercial aggregator could not be queried
without a finding of probable cause. This solution is simple in theory, but
difficult to apply, and quite restrictive to law enforcement.
First, the LEATPR Standards require law enforcement to know exactly
what is in these large aggregated databases. This presents a few practical
problems. The databases are proprietary, with companies unwilling to open
their collections to public scrutiny. 138 In addition, these datasets are
constantly evolving, with companies being purchased, new datasets being
collected, and new features integrated into the product line.139 There exists

136. STANDARD 25-4.2(a).
137. Id.
138. See Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection,
2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 357, 386-87 (2006) (describing the different types of private companies
that sell commercial data, including those that maintain proprietary databases).
139. See, e.g., Toby Anderson, LexisNexis Owner Reed Elseveir Buys ChoicePoint, USA
TODAY, Feb. 21, 2008, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/2008-02-21-reedchoicepoint_N.htm.
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a real question of how a law enforcement agent (or legislature) can go about
determining the requisite level of justification for these blended datasets
without knowing precisely what information exists in the datasets. The
puzzle of these aggregated, blended datasets is that information is being
collected so rapidly and being linked so easily that aggregators themselves
could be offering highly protected information without even knowing it.
Second, by requiring the highest level of justification to access records
(if any highly private information exists in the blended record), the
Standards create a disincentive for companies to build these datasets. Big
data businesses view accumulating and aggregating data as value added.
The benefit of big data is mining these unexpected correlations that reveal
patterns about particular people.140 Requiring data to be siloed into specific
records and identified by privacy labels would thwart the development of
these companies (or at least prevent law enforcement from using them).
Perversely, the greater the aggregation of data into larger and more helpful
datasets, the harder it would be for police to access the information under
Standard 25-4.2.
Finally, the practical effect of the default rule results in three suboptimal
options for police. If a state adopted the Standards’ rule for blended records,
police might: (a) not search these blended records; (b) wait for probable
cause to develop; or (c) claim some form of ignorance about what is in the
datasets and address claims of privacy violations at a later time. None of
these options cleanly allows police to gain the benefits of big data searches
in the first instance. Further, the analysis of what is highly protected is so
complex (even in an isolated and defined record), that police may be
reluctant to use these otherwise helpful datasets.
Again, these problems are more a function of the nature of the big data
environment than a fault of the LEATPR Standards, but they do make for a
difficult application of the Standards to these large aggregated, blended
datasets.

140. For example, knowing someone bought cigarettes might show they are a smoker.
Knowing someone bought cigarettes at a local bar at 2:00 am, might show they smoke and
drink alcohol. Knowing that they got into an accident at 3:00 am, might show that they
crashed as a result of their evening activities. Knowing that the accident occurred in an area
known for drug dealing and prostitution might suggest involvement in other illicit activities.
Knowing they were treated at a health clinic on Monday morning might further the suspicion
of their activities. Each fact alone is unrevealing, but together they demonstrate a pattern of
dangerous activities that might be relevant to insurance companies, consumer marketers, and
law enforcement.
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C. The LEATPR Standards and Prediction
Law enforcement has never been simply reactive to crime. 141 Preventing
crime, discovering ongoing crime, and deterring crime have always been a
concern of police. 142 The rise of big data policing offers new tools to
discover criminal patterns and thus solve crimes. And, critical to this
change is access to third party information sources.
One such law enforcement innovation allows police to use pattern
matching techniques to identify suspicious criminal activity. 143 For
example, in order to manufacture illegal methamphetamine, dealers must
purchase over the counter amphetamine products found in common cold
medications. Tracking the sales of those cold medications from particular
stores reveals who is buying the raw ingredients for a deadly drug. 144 This
information about cold medicines is held by the third party institution (the
drug store), and is both potentially relevant to a criminal investigation and
yet also reveals private information about a person’s health.
The LEATPR Standards directly address this concern in Standard 25-5.6,
which involves de-identified records. Under that provision, police with an
official certification can obtain de-identified records from third party
institutions. 145 Thus, with the appropriate certification, police could obtain
the sales of common cold medications at stores in a particular jurisdiction.
141. Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REV. 407,
437-39 (2006); Christopher Slobogin, A World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 39-41 (1991); Andrew E. Taslitz, Fortune-Telling and the Fourth Amendment: Of
Terrorism, Slippery Slopes, and Predicting the Future, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 195, 201 (2005).
142. A Nat’l Interoperable Broadband Network for Pub. Safety: Recent Devs. Before H.
Subcomm. on Commc’ns, Tech., & the Internet, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th
Cong. 15 (2009) (statement of William Bratton, Chief of Police, L.A. Police Dep’t) (“Very
soon, we will be moving to a Predictive Policing model where, by studying real time crime
patterns, we can anticipate where a crime is likely to occur.”).
143. Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV.
1, 4 (2005) (“Data mining’s computerized sifting of personal characteristics and behaviors
(sometimes called ‘pattern matching’) is a more thorough, regular, and extensive version of
criminal profiling, which has become both more widespread and more controversial in
recent years. Profiling varies in how it is conducted, but often focuses on features such as
age, gender, and race or ethnicity, sometimes coupled with behavior.”).
144. Jon Bardin, Kentucky Study Links Pseudophedrine Sales, Meth Busts, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/oct/16/news/la-heb-kentucky-countiespseudophedrine-meth-busts-20121016 (“Using that data, researchers were able to determine
how much of the drug was sold in each Kentucky county and compare it with the number of
meth busts in local police logs. . . . In any given county, an increase in pseudophedrine sales
of 13 grams per 100 people translated to an additional meth lab busted.”).
145. STANDARD 25-5.6.
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The Standards further require that finding the identity of a de-identified
record requires additional authorization under Standard 25-5.3. 146 Thus, to
discover the name of the person who purchased the cold medicine, the
police would be required to meet the appropriate category of justification
laid out in the Standards based on the level of privacy for the type of
information sought.
The problem with Standard 25-5.6 is that while protective of privacy in
theory, it really offers little protection in practice. Much has already been
written about the straight-forward technological problems of keeping deidentified records anonymous. 147 Data scholars and curious individuals
have taken to re-identifying previously de-identified data to demonstrate the
lack of protections. 148 Well-known companies such as Netflix and AOL
have seen de-identified user information re-identified, generating
unflattering news coverage and lawsuits. 149 Health records have received

146. STANDARD 25-5.3.
147. E.g., Schwartz & Solove, supra note 11, at 1854-55 (“In behavioral marketing,
companies generally do not track individuals by name. Instead, they use software to build
personal profiles that exclude this item but that contain a wealth of details about each
individual. In lieu of a name, these personal profiles are associated with a single
alphanumerical code that is placed on an individual’s computer to track their activity. In one
reported case, for example, the tracking file consisted of this string:
‘4c812db292272995e5416a323e79bd37.’
These codes are used to decide which
advertisements people see, as well as the kinds of products that are offered to them.” (citing
Angwin, supra note 49, at W1)).
148. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 4, at 257 (“[O]ver the past few years, computer
scientists have repeatedly shown that even anonymized data can typically be re-identified
and associated with specific individuals.”); Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in
Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1117, 1141 (2013) (“The concept of k-anonymity originated
with the work of Latanya Sweeney, who demonstrated, rather vividly, that birth date, zip
code, and sex are enough to uniquely identify much of the U.S. population.” (citing Latanya
Sweeney, k-Anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy, 10 INT’L J. UNCERTAINTY,
FUZZINESS & KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYS. 557, 558 (2002))).
149. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 148, at 1118-20 (describing the Netflix re-identification
problem and discussing the research of those who did the re-identification, including Arvind
Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov); Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed
for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A1 (“[S]earch by search, click
by click, the identity of AOL user No. 4417749 became easier to discern. There are queries
for ‘landscapers in Lilburn, Ga,’ several people with the last name Arnold and ‘homes sold
in shadow lake subdivision gwinnett county georgia.’ It did not take much investigating to
follow that data trail to Thelma Arnold, a 62-year old widow who lives in Lilburn, Ga.,
frequently researches her friends’ medical ailments and loves her three dogs. ‘Those are my
searches,’ she said, after a reporter read part of the list to her.”).
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the most attention, as the social utility of studying disease has been
compromised by the ease with which the health data can be re-identified. 150
These stories and problems are acknowledged if not satisfactorily
resolved in the LEATPR Standards. The Commentary on Standard 25-5.6
explicitly recognizes the dangers of de-identified data. 151 The Standards
reference Professor Paul Ohm’s resistance to the idea that de-identified data
can ever be protected in a world of expanding, aggregated information
sources. 152 While other scholars have countered this pessimism by
proposing methods to protect de-identified data, 153 importantly the
academic debate has not centered on law enforcement access to these
records.
In this way, the Standards may not fully address the dangers of police
access to de-identified data. Unlike academic researchers attempting to test
the vulnerabilities of de-identified data, law enforcement analysts seeking
to re-identify information have a particular and urgent goal in mind: solving
a crime. If a pattern emerges suggesting criminal activity in a de-identified
150. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Petitioners
at 12, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (No. 10-779) (“The PI data at issue
in this case presents grave re-identification issues.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Legal Scholars and Technical Experts in Support of
the Petitioners at 24, Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (No. 10-779) (“Patient [r]ecords are [a]t [r]isk
of [b]eing [r]eidentified.”); Robert Gellman, The Deidentification Dilemma: A Legislative
and Contractual Proposal, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 33, 37 (2010)
(“Personal information that no longer contains overt identifiers (name, identification
number, e-mail address, telephone number) can still be linked with known individuals.
Identity can be ascertained from simple, basic, widely available non-unique identifiers
(sometimes called quasi-identifiers).”).
151. STANDARD 25-5.6 commentary.
152. STANDARD 25-1.1(g) commentary; see also Ohm, supra note 11, at 1746 (“The
accretion problem is this: Once an adversary has linked two anonymized databases together,
he can add the newly linked data to his collection of outside information and use it to help
unlock other anonymized databases. Success breeds further success.”); Schwartz & Solove,
supra note 11, at 1847 (“In sum, whether information can be re-identified depends on
technology and corporate practices that permit the linking of de-identified data with alreadyidentified data. Moreover, as additional pieces of identified data become available, it
becomes easier to link them to de-identified data because there are likely to be more data
elements in common.”).
153. E.g., Andrew Chin & Anne Klinefelter, Differential Privacy as a Response to the
Reidentification Threat: The Facebook Advertiser Case Study, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1417,
1427-28 (2012) (proposing a differential privacy theory); Khaled El Emam et al., A
Systematic Review of Re-Identification Attacks on Health Data, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2011,
available at http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%C2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.
0028071; Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011).
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source, then police have the ability (if not a duty) to investigate by trying to
match other patterns from other data sources to identify the individual. All
of the methods of re-identification and all of the government resources can
be brought to the case. With enough effort, police should be able to match
or surpass the abilities of academic researchers to re-identify data.
In addition, in many cases, because of the other available third party
data, police will not need to take the second step under the LEATPR
Standards for direct re-identification. Simply stated, once a suspicious
pattern has been identified (be it unusual purchases, suspicious comments,
or criminal associates), police can use indirect re-identification; police have
enough other investigatory resources to re-identify the data without relying
on the data itself. For example, in our methamphetamine purchases
example, police know from de-identified data that a particular person
bought cold medicine from a particular store, at a particular time, and on a
particular day. While police could go through the direct re-identification
process under the Standards to get the identity of the purchaser, police
could also review store security tapes, speak with witnesses, track license
plate reader records from the stores, or obtain other surveillance tapes for
each of the times in question. 154 Matching the images of who was at the
stores at the correct time would also identify the suspect. In addition,
police could request the cell phone records of all the people in that store
location at the time. If a particular phone was in the store at the time of
each of the purchases, police could use phone data to identify the
purchaser. 155 Then, police could either search police databases for the
phone number, or if necessary, ask for a court order now that reasonable
suspicion has been generated (since only one phone number matched the
time and place of each of the suspicious purchases).
The de-identified data offers other clues as well. With a phone number
(even de-identified), police can see who else called (or was called by) that
number, thus generating a network of connections for individuals involved
154. Don Babwin, Chicago Video Surveillance Gets Smarter, USA TODAY, Sept. 27,
2007, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-09-27-4171345706_x.htm; Cara
Buckley, Police Plan Web of Surveillance for Downtown, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2007, at A0;
John Del Signore, NYPD Tightens Surveillance in Subway’s “Ring of Steel”, GOTHAMIST
(Sept. 21, 2010), http://gothamist.com/2010/09/21/nypd_tightens_surveillance_in_subwa.
php; David Gambacorta & Morgan Zalot, Surveillance Cameras Prove Helpful in Crime
Probes, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 1, 2013, http://articles.philly.com/2013-02-01/news/366618
95_1_surveillance-cameras-surveillance-network-high-crime-areas;
Somini
Sengupta,
Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2013, at A1.
155. See Henderson, supra note 90, at 805-06 (discussing how the “high country bandits”
were apprehended using cell phone surveillance techniques).
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in possible illegal activity. Those phone numbers (still de-identified) can
then be run through law enforcement databases and re-identified to generate
names and addresses. Again, the identifying number allows police to
search for all connections to that number, creating a matrix of the suspect’s
associates. The combination of direct re-identification technology and
indirect re-identification through other law enforcement techniques means
that much de-identified data can be re-identified by law enforcement.
While this is not a negative result, it may call into question the protections
built within the Standards, which seem to assume that de-identification of
data is a substantial protection.
III. Solutions: Smoothing the Distortions
This Part offers possible solutions to the problems raised in this article.
It focuses on three major questions discussed in Part II: (1) the problem of
terminology in the Standards, (2) the problem of aggregation of blended
records, and (3) the problem of de-identification.
A. Problem of Terminology
As discussed in Part II.A., the Standard’s chosen terminology offers little
protection in a world of big data. Specifically, relevance and reasonable
suspicion, two already weak standards, are easily surmounted by the
availability of personalized information that provides a vast quantity (if not
quality) of data points and particularized information about a suspect.
The solution, while perhaps frustrating to the drafters of the Standards
(who no doubt thought carefully about the chosen language), seeks to
ratchet up the protection by changing the terminology. Essentially, I
propose a one level shift, increasing the level of protection by one order.
Thus, I would propose the following standards to replace the existing
terminology: For nonprivate information held by third parties, I would
require a relevance standard. For minimally private information, I would
require reasonable suspicion. For moderately private information, I would
require probable cause to believe the information in the record will lead to
evidence of a crime. For highly private information, I would require
probable cause to believe that the information in the record will reveal
criminal activity.
These suggestions leave much of the Standards untouched. The
determination of the level of privacy of the information remains the same.
The equivalence—central to the Standards (in terms of a relation between
level of privacy and level of justification)—remains intact (even though the
justifications themselves have been ratcheted up one degree). And the
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rationale for the levels of justification remains largely unchanged. The
more specific arguments for the changed standard are addressed in turn.
Not Private Information. Under the Standards, no justification is needed
to access nonprivate information. Under the proposed changes, a relevance
justification would be required similar to Standard 25-5.3(b). This would
mean that police could not simply vacuum up all personal data, even if
other private companies could do so. This change requires police to justify
why the information was relevant to an investigation. Of course, as the
relevance standard is quite low, this burden should not be difficult to
overcome. If the information is not relevant to a police investigation, police
should not be collecting it for investigatory purposes.156 However, similar
to Standard 25-5.3(b), this relevance justification could be met by a
prosecutorial or agency subpoena without a court order.
Minimally Private Information. Under the current Standards, a relevance
subpoena under Standard 25-5.2(b) is all that is required to obtain
minimally private information.157 Under the proposed change, reasonable
suspicion via a judicial order would be required. Again, as demonstrated,
because reasonable suspicion in a big data world is such an easily
surmountable standard, this is not a significant burden. Minimally private
information is still quite revealing and to justify access to phone contact
records or the like, police should have to determine that there is some
particularized and individualized reason to obtain the information.
Otherwise, fishing expeditions for data will result on a mass scale.
Moderately Private Information.
Under the current Standards,
moderately private information can be obtained in one of three ways: (1) a
judicial determination that there is reasonable suspicion to believe the
information in the record contains or will lead to evidence of a crime 158; (2)

156. Such a suggestion runs counter to the well-established tradition that law
enforcement should have access to the same records that ordinary citizens have access to on
a regular basis. For example, if a citizen can search my utility records in a jurisdiction that
allows public access to such records, then the argument goes, police should have similar
access. See STANDARD 25-4.1(c) commentary. The argument presented above would
require police to meet a relevance requirement before accessing those same records, thus
imposing an additional barrier to access. While recognizing the imposition, the proposal
above acknowledges that governmental access to personal data is different than individual
access to that same data. The government simply has more power than an individual, and
thus checks should be built to inhibit governmental conduct as distinguished from individual
access.
157. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(iii).
158. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(ii).
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a judicial determination that the record is relevant to an investigation 159; or
(3) a prosecutorial certification that the record is relevant to an
investigation. 160 These are rather low standards of protection. Under my
proposed change, these options would be replaced with a modified probable
cause standard—“probable cause that the record will lead to evidence of a
crime.” This language comes directly from the current Standard 255.2(a)(ii). Notice that the language of the Standards does not require
probable cause that “an offense has been or is being committed,”161 but
only that the record “will lead to evidence of crime.” 162 The Standards,
thus, adopt a rather indirect requirement, 163 which would allow judges to
sign judicial orders several steps removed from actually uncovering the
crime. This modified probable cause standard could be adopted to replace
25-5.2(a)(ii)-(iv).
Justifications for this change include that (1) the current standards are
quite weak for moderately private information, and (2) the proposed
language still provides a great deal of flexibility. Many things will lead to
evidence of a crime that may not be criminal themselves. A review of bank
transactions may suggest criminal activity without being criminal
themselves. It is illegal to steal money, but not to deposit stolen money.
Similarly, long term GPS surveillance may lead to a connection with drug
dealing (as in United States v. Jones), 164 but may not itself demonstrate
overt criminal activity. By emphasizing the “will lead to” language, this
proposed change ensures a measure of protection while still allowing police
to obtain necessary information.
Highly Private Information. Under the current Standard 25-5.2(a)(i), a
judicial determination that there is probable cause to believe the
information in the record contains or will lead to evidence of a crime is
required to obtain highly private information.165 Under the proposed
159. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(iii).
160. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(iv).
161. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
162. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(i).
163. The “will lead to evidence” language may however be interpreted to be a tougher
standard than this author believes. As Professor Slobogin mentioned at the Oklahoma Law
Review Symposium, Nov. 15, 2013, the language could be interpreted to require a high
standard of proof. “Will” does not equate with “may” and thus “will lead to” could be
understood to require a high level of justification. See also Christopher Slobogin, Cause to
Believe What?: The Importance of Defining a Search’s Object—Or, How the ABA Would
Analyze the NSA Metadata Surveillance Program, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 725, 741 (2014).
164. 132 S. Ct. 945, 947-48 (2012).
165. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(i).
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change, the probable cause language would really be a probable cause
standard—not that there is probable cause that the evidence will lead to
evidence of a crime, but probable cause that the records will reveal criminal
activity. Specifically, the records must provide evidence of past or ongoing
criminal activity or be usable in a prosecution for an identifiable criminal
activity. For highly private information, the standards should be equally
high.
The above suggestions, again, only seek a slight change in the LEATPR
Standards to counteract the effect of big data. The chosen terminology
seeks to raise the level of protection without disturbing the underlying logic
and proportionality reasoning of the existing Standards.
B. Problem of Aggregation
As discussed in Part II.B., the problem of blended records means that
there are differing levels of privacy in these large aggregated datasets,
which can no longer be identified by a single category of information. This
reality distorts the level of privacy and confuses the level of justification
needed to access the records.
The solution proposed runs counter to the default rule suggested in the
LEAPTR Standards, but is more consistent with the big data environment.
It acknowledges the reality that police do not necessarily know what
information is included in the blended datasets, and thus, police cannot
determine what level of privacy is required. This confusion will result in
officers either waiting until they generate the highest level of suspicion (on
the chance that there might be highly private information), or forgoing these
queries into aggregated, blended datasets. 166
The solution proposed allows broad access into these mixed datasets, but
then requires police to establish minimization processes to guard against
revelation of highly private information. Minimization is a well-established
concept in surveillance law. 167 Essentially, investigators are required to
166. See supra Part II.B.
167. E.g., Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could
Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 184 (2012) (“Minimization requirements are not a new
idea. They already play a privacy protective role in several other surveillance statutes,
including the Wiretap Act, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005 (‘PATRIOT Act’), and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (‘FISA’).”); Tene &
Polonetsky, supra note 4, at 259 (“Through various iterations and formulations, data
minimization has remained a fundamental principle of privacy law. Organizations are
required to limit the collection of personal data to the minimum extent necessary to obtain
their legitimate goals. Moreover, they are required to delete data that is no longer used for
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ignore or shield information that they acquire that does not fit the categories
of information they are justified in collecting. 168 In addition, investigators
are generally prohibited from sharing or using that information. 169
Minimization, thus, protects from unintentional disclosures and limits the
use of the information for investigative purposes. In wiretap surveillance,
police must minimize content from individuals not identified in the wiretap
warrant. 170 In national security surveillance of overseas telephone calls,
investigators must minimize content from U.S. citizens. 171 If information is
uncovered that is unrelated to the targeted justification, investigators may
not use the information (subject to some exceptions, including a law
enforcement exception).172 Minimization thus allows an overbroad search,
with carefully designated protections to limit the information revealed.
It must be acknowledged that traditional minimization analysis does not
neatly map onto the blended records problem. In a traditional minimization

the purposes for which they were collected and to implement restrictive policies with respect
to the retention of personal data in identifiable form.”).
168. Wu, supra note 148, at 1173 (“Data minimization provides that ‘organizations
should only collect PII (‘Personally Identifiable Information’) that is directly relevant and
necessary to accomplish the specified purpose(s) and only retain PII for as long as is
necessary to fulfill the specified purpose(s).’” (quoting National Strategy for Trusted
Identities in Cyberspace, WHITE HOUSE, Apr. 2011, at 45)).
169. Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data
Protection vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1413 (2012) (“Data minimization
posits that holders of personal information should minimize the collection and use of
personal information to protect privacy rights.”).
170. Id. (“Data minimization is an important principle in wiretap law, where the state
gains lawful access to the relevant conversations, but should not use the existence of the
wiretap to trawl through the rest of the conversations on a phone line.”); see also 18 U.S.C. §
2518(5) (2012) (requiring that wiretaps “be conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception”).
171. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982)), requires “minimization” protocols to limit the
collection, retention, and dissemination of information relating to United States citizens. See
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1804(a)(5), 1805(a)(4).
172. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (requiring minimization procedures); id. § 1801(h)
(defining FISA minimization procedures); id. § 1801(h)(3) (detailing law enforcement
exception); see also Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really Is at Stake with the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008 and Ideas for Future Surveillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
269, 302 (2009) (“While minimization procedures are supposed to prevent the retention and
dissemination of information that is not related to foreign intelligence, there are notable
exceptions. Under the minimization procedures, ‘information that is evidence of a crime
which has been, is being, or is about to be committed’ can ‘be retained or disseminated for
law enforcement purposes.’”).

870

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:831

situation, the targeted individual guides the limitation.173 A warrant might
allow for all phone calls of a particular person to be recorded, with the
understanding that other callers from that phone line would be protected by
minimization standards. Similarly, foreign nationals may be targeted for
telephone surveillance with the understanding that U.S. citizens in
communication with those individuals will be protected by minimization.
Both of these hypotheticals share the commonality that the level of privacy
is irrelevant when it comes to the targeted individual. Police can obtain
both highly private and nonprivate information about the target. Only
information about others (not the target) must be minimized.
In the blended records context, one may also have this problem of
revealing information about nontargeted individuals, but it is not the main
concern. The main problem is that with broad access to blended records
police will see highly private information about the target without the
appropriate justification. In addition, police may be tempted to use that
information to support their investigation.
My minimization proposal seeks to address these concerns, but candidly
only addresses the second issue of use. I would suggest a minimization
process that mirrors the categories of protection in the LEATPR Standard
25-4.2. 174 For aggregated, blended datasets, police would be allowed to
access the dataset without the highest level of justification, but only able to
retrieve and use information for the level of justification they had authority
to access. All other information would be minimized and not available for
use as the basis of a justification for further investigation.
For example, assume police suspect an individual of drug dealing.
Assume they only have reasonable suspicion (not probable cause),
preventing them from obtaining highly private information. Police have
access to a large commercial “big data” database that has aggregated and
blended a host of available personal, financial, public, consumer, and health
data. Some of this data is highly private; some is not private. Under the
current LEATPR Standards, because there is some highly private
information, police would need probable cause to access the records.
Under my proposed modification, police would be able to search this data
without probable cause, but only be able to use information that fell within
the level of justification they possessed (reasonable suspicion). Thus, in the
173. United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1307 (1st Cir. 1987) (“This minimization
requirement spotlights the interest in confining intrusions as narrowly as possible so as not to
trench impermissibly upon the personal lives and privacy of wiretap targets and those who,
often innocently, come into contact with such suspects.”).
174. See STANDARD 25-4-2(a).
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search through the database, should highly private information about
substance abuse, mental illness, or the like be revealed, police would be
precluded from using that information in their investigation. Of course, the
police officers who conducted the search would be aware of the private
facts, but protocols could be created to keep this information confidential.
Such a minimization process would obviously turn on drafting
appropriate protocols for protection. These protocols would need to specify
with clarity the types of information that would be allowed under each
justification. Such a categorization would be immensely difficult as a
legislature would have to determine ex ante what type of content would fit
in each category. In addition, the police officer would also have to be able
to determine with clarity what level of privacy the information contained.
While perhaps the database companies themselves could use technology to
sort, categorize, and code the level of privacy (making access to highly
private information more difficult), the categorization process will be
contested, contingent, and likely confused.
The protocols would, however, precisely determine the limitations on
use of this minimized data. As with other minimization protocols, limiting
the use and dissemination of the inappropriately obtained information
provides a significant protection. Usually, knowledge about a target (even
highly private knowledge) has less of an impact than using that knowledge
to further an investigation. Protocols designed to restrict law enforcement
use of the data could thus be effective protections within aggregated,
blended datasets.
C. Problem of De-Identification
As discussed in Part II.C., the problem with de-identification involves
the ease with which such data can be re-identified through direct
technological or indirect third party surveillance means. One solution is to
allow access to de-identified records under Standard 25-5.6 only when there
is no chance that the information can be re-identified.
Currently, such a guarantee that de-identified data will remain
anonymous is technologically impossible, meaning that in practice deidentified records are not really de-identified and should be recognized as
such. Certainly, some companies have taken steps to reduce the possibility
that de-identified information will be re-identified. As one example,
companies like StreetLight Data, which use de-identified GPS information
to track human activity, have developed privacy policies which require that
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all identifiable information be removed. 175 The policies further require
encrypted identifiers with no access to the decryption algorithms as well as
aggregation into groups of fifteen or more so no individualized information
is used. 176 But, many times the information police wish to access in the deidentified data will not be useful in that protected format.
Thus, accepting the current technological reality, the de-identified
records mentioned in Standard 25-5.6 are really misnamed. Police
requesting these records have access to re-identification procedures;
therefore the records are merely disguised, not protected. This reality
should caution legislatures from adopting Standard 25-5.6 without
additional protections.
One protection would be to allow access to de-identified data only when
police can provide the necessary level of justification for the type of privacy
in the records. Whereas before police had unlimited access to the deidentified records, but had to justify (based on the appropriate level of
privacy) particular access within those records, one proposal would be to
require the same level of justification to do the initial search. Thus, to
access the de-identified drug store sales records, police would need to
demonstrate the appropriate justification (i.e., relevance, reasonable
suspicion) associated with the drug store records. Then, to get additional
access to re-identify a particular record, police would again need to
demonstrate that same level of justification, but as to a particular record.
This proposal, of course, would be restrictive to law enforcement,
precluding many of the pattern-matching searches that look for anomalies
in the data without any suspicion at all.177
Another solution would be to adopt the current Standards, but simply ban
police from using other indirect methods to de-identify the data. If police
wish to re-identify the person, the only recourse would be to use the
protocols in the Standards. Such a solution, preventing law enforcement
from using available (and traditional) techniques to re-identify suspects has

175. See Privacy Policy, STREETLIGHT DATA, http://streetlightdata.com/privacy/ (last
visited Mar. 18, 2014).
176. Id.
177. As a practical matter, this protection might allow police to conduct de-identified
searches on the sale of pseudoephedrine because of its connection to the manufacture of
illegal methamphetamine, but not to searches on the sale of Advil or other drugs not
connected to a suspicion of illegal use. In this way, some de-identified records would be
allowed (if connected to a particularized criminal investigation), but large scale mass
surveillance of third party records would be prohibited.

2014]

BIG DATA DISTORTIONS

873

little to offer for its support, except that it does protect identities in deidentified data.
Finally, one could simply hope that the technology of de-identification
solves the problems of re-identification. Technology may be created that
allows truly de-identified data to stay anonymous. This would of course
allow the Standards to be used as originally designed. Whether a
technological fix can be envisioned, however, is beyond the scope of this
article.
IV. Conclusion
Any prediction of how the LEATPR Standards will withstand the
distortions of big data must begin with the fundamental question of the
purpose of the Standards themselves. My reading of the Standards is that
they seek to regulate 178 law enforcement access to personal information,
but not necessarily affirmatively protect that information. This distinction
between regulation of police and protection of individuals has significant
implications. As discussed in the section entitled “Need for the Standards,”
the drafters begin with the recognition that “[g]overnment access to third
party records . . . is surely among the most important and common
investigatory activities.” 179 This is not to say that the Standards do not
acknowledge the important interests of “privacy, freedom of expression,
and social participation,” 180 but only that the starting point seems to favor
law enforcement access rather than personal privacy protections. 181
As demonstrated, big data policing compounds an already limited
protection of personal information in the LEAPTR Standards. The
terminology chosen, the default rules, and the technological fixes may
178. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 4-5 (“American norms of limited
government and principles of freedom of speech and association thus require that law
enforcement records access be regulated.”).
179. Id. at 2.
180. Id. at 5.
181. According to Professor Andy Taslitz, who was a member of the drafting committee:
Law enforcement members were vehemently opposed to any justification
requirement whatsoever, predicting that criminal investigations in serious cases
would be rendered virtually impossible. The judge, defense lawyers, and law
professors on the drafting committee, however, saw some level of justification
as essential to prevent governmental overreaching―to regulate, without
prohibiting, legitimate law enforcement work.
Andrew E. Taslitz, Cybersurveillance Without Restraint? The Meaning and Social Value of
the Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion Standards in Governmental Access to ThirdParty Electronic Records, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 839, 841-42 (2013).
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not—upon analysis—be very protective in a big data era. Thus, a
deferential framework in a big data world may ultimately result in very
little protection for personal data.
In many ways, the emerging big data world may necessitate a stronger
emphasis on protecting private information. To create a balanced approach,
consistent with the goal of law enforcement access but cognizant of privacy
concerns of highly private information, the LEAPTR Standards may need
to evolve with the technology. The solutions proposed are neither complete
nor comprehensive, but provide a starting point for discussion about this
complex issue. They offer some guidance about ways to improve the
LEAPTR Standards in the face of big data’s distorting effects.

